

Related Efforts and Future Activities

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Questions and Issues That Technical Proliferation Risk Assessments Can Inform

- Relative advantages of alternative nuclear energy systems
- System architecture (e.g. once through vs. closed fuel cycles)
- International arrangements vs. national programs
- Energy-Environment-Economics-Nonproliferation-Security-Safety Trade-offs
- Many stakeholders...information needs to be presented to each user in an understandable way

Evaluations should consider...

- Country Context
 - Objectives
 - Capabilities
 - Strategies
- System design features relevant to PR&PP
- Safeguards and Security Contexts
- Policy considerations
- 3 Stages for Evaluation: Acquisition, Processing, Weaponization (not usually)

Assessment Methodologies

- Gen IV PR&PP Evaluation Methodology
- IAEA INPRO Methodology
- MAUI variants
- SAPRA
- Adaptations from Reactor Safety Arena
- Older approaches:
 - NASAP/INFCE
 - o **TOPS**

What we learned from Reactor Safety

- WASH-1400 provided risk perspective, departing from and adding to deterministic, prescriptive perspective
- It helped to set safety goals when requested by Congress in the aftermath of TMI-2 accident
- It highlighted the gaps in risk analysis:
 - Human Factors
 - Core melt and containment response
 - o Data Needs
 - Common cause failures, dependencies
- \rightarrow Lessons for PR&PP Area?
- \rightarrow Can we risk-inform this area as we do Safety?

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Enabling "Safeguards-by-Design"

- Designers need to be informed about "safeguardability" of their product
- Optimization of inherent features and extrinsic measures
- Need a comprehensive tool, but with flexibility to make user-dependent decisions that account for design constraints and operational goals
- PRPP methodology provides this utility

Studies Performed*

- ESFR: Example Sodium Fast Reactor w/fuel cycle
- PRR-1: UREX1a, COEX, PUREX
- PRR-2: UREX suite, COEX, Pyro, PUREX
- PRR-3: SFR, VHTR, CANDU, ALWR
- SMR: Integral PWR, Barge Reactor

*ESFR performed by international group; others by U.S. participants for NNSA

Observations from Evaluation Process

- Multiple pathways/scenarios highlight fact there are no simple answers to the relative PR&PP advantages of different processes
- Even a qualitative analysis is useful for informing decision-makers on "big picture" e.g., for which threat scenarios do particular process characteristics make a difference, and how, and where do they not.
- Useful framework for integrating key findings and insights from multiple, more narrowly focused, technical studies

The Policy-Technology Nexus

- <u>Policy</u> informs the statement of the questions to be addressed
- <u>Technical</u> evaluations are performed to provide clear statements of alternatives (indicating and displaying degrees of differentiation)
- <u>Policy</u> is then used again to help choose among the alternatives defined in the results

<u>Do not infuse technical evaluation portion</u> with subjective notions from policy

Possible Future Applications for PR&PP

- Enhancing GIF Designs
- Enabling "Safeguards by Design"
- Guiding Future Global Fuel Cycle Architectures
- Integration of PR&PP with Other Performance Objectives
- PR&PP methodology as a Quality Assurance Tool -benchmark standard