

Panel 3-2 Nuclear Cooperation with non-NPT States

# Nuclear Cooperation with India: From Non-proliferation Perspective

Masahiko Asada  
Kyoto University, Japan

# Objections (1)

## From nuclear non-proliferation perspectives

1. Separation of military and civilian nuclear facilities leads to the recognition of India as a nuclear-weapon State.
2. Supply of Uranium will free up Indian uranium for military buildup.
3. Application of Safeguards or Additional Protocol to civilian facilities hardly serves any purpose, as long as the existence of military nuclear facilities is recognized.

## Objections (2)

### From nuclear disarmament perspectives

4. Nuclear test moratorium is not a new undertaking; its credibility is questionable given India's refusal to even sign the CTBT.
5. Cooperation in FMCT talks is questionable given the Indian refusal to declare moratorium in fissile material production.

## Objections (3)

### With the NPT regime as a whole in mind

6. Nuclear cooperation with non-NPT parties may adversely affect the credibility of the NPT (non-nuclear-weapon States get nuclear cooperation in return for joining NPT).
7. It may adversely affect the project for universalizing the Additional Protocol to offer nuclear cooperation to States yet to conclude even CSA.
8. It may adversely affect the future of meaningful fuel supply assurance system to offer fuel supply assurance to States with no intention to abandon sensitive nuclear technologies.
9. It would be difficult to object to possible Chinese nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.

# Crisis of normativity of NSG guidelines and NPT decision

1. Discussion in the NSG on the Chinese supply of two nuclear reactors to Pakistan; China invoking grandfather clause  
Cf. Pakistan's objection to start negotiations on the FMCT in the CD
2. NPT Review Conference 2010 Final Document  
“The Conference reaffirms that [existing or] new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material ... should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” (para.117)