



SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY AND DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION: RUSSIAN PROSPECTIVE

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LEGAL BASE FOR SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION

- NPT
- Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC – 153, NNWS) or Special Safeguards Agreement (NWS)
- Subsidiary Arrangement
- DIQ
- Facility Attachment



LEGAL BASE FOR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION

- Bilateral or multilateral Treaty between NWS
- Individual Verification Agreement between IAEA (or other international designated agency) and NWS with relevant set of documents prescribing obligations and commitments from two sides (trilateral initiative as example).



IAEA or International Community Concern

- NWS compliance with disarmament commitments.
- Verification of SNM management in the process of disarmament.
- Preventing of sensitive information proliferation (NPT obligations)



NWS Concern

- Comply with NPT obligation and commitments
- National security concern.
- Follow State Secret Regulations.



Trilateral Initiative Experience

- Initially IAEA was invited by two sides (US and Russia) to be independent verification body.
- Full set of documents for verification process was developed jointly.
- Special methods and instruments (with information barriers) were developed to prevent disclosing sensitive (secret) information obtained during verification process.
- Limitations by national laws stopped further implementation of trilateral initiative in practice.



Conclusion

- Classical safeguards technology can not be implemented for disarmament process.
- Most of safeguards/verification techniques must be modernized and adjusted for this specific purposes.
- National law on secret information connected with nuclear weapons must be adjusted in accordance with obligation and commitments taken under disarmament treaty.
- IAEA (or other verification body) should be properly organized/equipped/trained.



Thanks for your attention
(arigato)

Any questions?