Outline of Panel Discussion 1-2; main points for discussion

本パネルの議論のポイントと進め方

Moderator
Professor Nobuyasu ABE
Once a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is concluded, it will impose major new obligations on the five countries that have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nuclear-weapon states and the other countries that are not parties to the NPT. (Many of them possess nuclear weapons and sometimes are called de facto nuclear-weapons states.) These obligations can work to reduce the inequalities that exist between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT.

兵器用核分裂性物質生産禁止条約（Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty: FMCT）が発効すれば、核兵器保有国に核軍縮への義務を課し、かつ、NPT条約上制限を受けない事実上の核兵器国をも規制する。この規制により、核兵器国と非核兵器国との不平等性も軽減される。
With a view to establishing an FMCT verification regime to ensure that signatories do not produce any more fissile material for nuclear weapons we ask the panel to address the following key points. Our hope is that the robust verification regime would help prevent anyone (e.g. terrorists) from acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons as well and ultimately contribute to achieving a “world without nuclear weapons.”

締約国及びテロリストによる核物質入手の機会を絶ち、核兵器の無い世界を実現するために、FMCT検証制度の確立を目指し、パネリストの間で以下のポイントについて議論する。
The U.S. and Russian efforts toward the initiation and conclusion of an FMCT negotiation and bringing it into force and the reduction of nuclear weapons will be summarized in this panel, and three important issues, verification, governance and technologies, prohibited and non-prohibited activities, and materials definitions subject to the FMCT will be discussed.
The IAEA’s contributions toward establishing a permanent FMCT framework and governance and the experience gained through the trilateral initiative with the U.S. and Russia will be discussed. The experience of the trilateral activities, together with the IAEA’s extensive verification know-how and history, may be used as the basis for discussion of possible and suitable FMCT roles for the IAEA.

恒久的なFMCT制度・管理体制の確立を目指したIAEAの貢献、米国・ロシア・IAEAとの間の三者イニシアチブで得られた経験。この経験は、IAEAの経験・ノウハウの提供と供に、FMCT発効に向けたIAEAの役割。
As the only non-nuclear weapon state that has extensive lessons-learned and experience of safeguards technology development and implementation, and has a full nuclear fuel cycle from enrichment to reprocessing, Japanese panelists will present their views on the applicability of safeguards technologies to FMCT verification.

IAEA保障措置の実施及び技術開発で培われた教訓・経験を有し、かつ、濃縮から再処理までのフル核燃料サイクル施設を保有している唯一の非核兵器国である我が国の、保障措置技術のFMCT検証技術への応用等の考え。
Format of this panel

• We will first have the following panelists’ presentations and then proceed to exchanging views among the panelists followed by questions from the floor.
  - 以下に示す全てのパネリストの発表に従って、議論のポイントについて、パネリスト間の意見交換、聴衆からの質問を受けて進める

• The U.S. and Russian efforts and thoughts on FMCT and the related issues
  - 米国とロシアのFMCT及び関連する事項に対する取組み・考え

• IAEA’s efforts in the field of disarmament
  - IAEAの軍縮分野での取り組み

• Possible Japanese contribution
  - 可能な我が国の貢献

• Other related activities
  - 他の関連する活動