

Topic 1

Restoring and strengthening confidence in the NPT regime

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Traditional challenges facing the NPT regime

The credibility of the NPT regime has traditionally been challenged in basically three aspects:

- **Stalemate and backsliding on nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, due to lack of efforts by NWS;**
- **Attempts by NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, and difficulties in effectively preventing some of the hard cases; and**
- **From the perspective of the NAM countries, the lack of promotion of the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy**

Current challenges facing the NPT regime

- Traditional challenges, including the stalemate on nuclear disarmament as well as deterioration of the North Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation issues
- Deteriorating security environment due to strategic competition
 - Growing interest in bolstering and/or acquiring nuclear deterrence capabilities
 - Relative decline of US power to lead the NPT regime
- The (opportunistic) behavior of NWS (esp. Russia and China)—which have a privileged position in the NPT regime and should therefore bear greater responsibility—contrary to the nonproliferation norms and obligations, in pursuit of their own narrow national interests rather than the international public interest.

Not only undermining the credibility of the NPT regime, but also lowering psychological threshold/barriers of NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons.

Opportunistic behaviors of the NWS

- Invasion with nuclear intimidation of NNWS
- Attacks on or occupation of nuclear power plants and other facilities
- Toleration/acquiescence, and/or support for nuclear proliferators (North Korea and Iran), including violations of UN Security Council resolutions
- Possible diversion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (cf. FBRs and reprocessing facilities) to nuclear weapons purposes—at least, no commitment to use solely for peaceful purposes
- Nuclear cooperation not tied to the implementation of enhanced nonproliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security measures (to a large extent compared to Western countries)

Efforts for restoring and strengthening confidence in the NPT regime

- Further strengthening of the supply-side approach (cf. the IAEA safeguards and export controls), as having been done over the past several decades since the establishment of the NPT regime?
- Rather, necessity of emphasizing more strongly the importance of their implementation, as well as the demand-side approach (cf. reducing incentives to acquire or bolster nuclear deterrent) and the will to steadily and faithfully implement and comply?

Efforts should be taken by NWS

- **It is necessary to recall that:**

- Restoring and strengthening confidence in the NPT regime serves the international public interest as well as the national interest of each country, especially to the NWS which have benefited greatly from the regime; and
- The pursuit of narrow national interests would erode the international/nuclear order, which consequently undermines their national interests (as history has repeatedly shown), precisely because we live in the era of strategic competition.

- **There is an urgent need to:**

- Refrain from such behavior, which is contrary to the principles, norms and rules of the NPT regime; and
- Reaffirm and implement their obligations/commitments under the NPT regime.

Efforts should be taken by NNWS

- **Good faith adherence with nonproliferation obligations and norms**
- **Acceptance, implementation, and adherence to supply-side approaches as embodying nonproliferation norms: the Additional Protocols, export controls, conditionality of enrichment and reprocessing activities, stricter conditions for nuclear cooperation, etc**
- **The need not to tolerate/acquiesce to, or explore to get benefits from NWS behaving contrary to the NPT regime**

Efforts should be taken by Japan

- **Accelerating outreach activities (esp. to the Global South)**
 - The importance of universalizing the AP (as a safeguards standard), strengthening export controls, and bolstering nuclear safety and security related measures
 - Clear condemnation of activities by NWS that violate the principles, norms, and rules of the NPT regime
 - Rejection of nuclear cooperation that imposes only minimal conditions on nuclear nonproliferation, safety and security obligations
- **Developing competitive proliferation-resistant reactors—in part to maintain influence over nonproliferation norms, rules and order**
- **Continuing/enhancing financial, technical and personnel support for the IAEA**
- **Promoting disarmament and nonproliferation education**